Keywords: C78; G21; K22; Financial networks; Contagion; Default resolution; Nash Bargaining;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: C78; D47; Matching; School choice; Lotteries; Ex-ante stability;
Keywords: C78; D47; D71; D78; Responsive; Acceptant; WWARP; Satisficing;
Keywords: C71; C78; Bargaining set; Core; Matching market; Assignment game; Cooperative game;
Keywords: C78; Shapley value; Coalitional game;
Keywords: C78; K23; L82; L88; O34; Z11; Efficient contracting; Termination right; Copyright law; Bargaining; Author-publisher relationship;
Keywords: Borrowing constraints; Life-cycle household saving; Nonlinear estimation; Turkey; C78; D61; D78; I20;
Keywords: Ultimatum game; Altruism; Competition; Incomplete information; C78; J33;
Keywords: Q57; C78; C61; Bioeconomic modeling; Emerald ash borer; Invasive species; Nash bargaining; Optimal control; Land ownership;
Keywords: C78; D03; Matching; Deferred acceptance algorithm; Suboptimal behavior;
Keywords: C73; C78; Matching; Graph; Stochastic stability; Maximal matching; Maximum matching;
Keywords: Electricity markets; Wind power; Risk hedging; Bargaining game; ISO; Independent System Operator; WPP; Wind Power Producer; DAM; Day-Ahead Market; RTM; Real-Time Market; DAP; Day-Ahead market Price; RTP; Real-Time market price; MCP; Market Clearing Price;
Keywords: C78; C72; D81; C90; Nash demand game; Unstructured bargaining; Real effort; Dominant bargaining power; Experiment;
Keywords: Bargaining; Experiment; Gender; Payment scheme; C78; C91; D82; J16; J33;
Keywords: C78; D44; D47; D82; Matching; Strategy-proofness; Lone Wolf Theorem; Rural Hospitals Theorem;
Keywords: C78; L23; Multi-person bargaining; Bargaining order;
Keywords: School choice; Enrollment; Boston mechanism; Priorities; Private schools; C78; D63; I24;
Keywords: C72; C78; D85; Overlapping coalitions; Group structures; Constitutions; Stability; Many-to-many matchings;
Keywords: Consumption; Savings; Interest rates; Income fluctuation problem; Dynamics; C70; C78; D51; D58;
Keywords: Ultimatum Game; Self-control; Ego depletion; Social preferences; C72; C78; C91;
Keywords: C78; D47; C71; Two-sided matching; Dynamic matching; Stable matching; Market-design;
Keywords: C78; D44; D47; D82; Matching; Large markets; Lone wolf theorem; Strategy-proofness;
Keywords: C72; C78; Bargaining; Rent-seeking; Surplus destruction; Discount factor; Timing; Commitment;
Keywords: C78; D82; D83; Bargaining game; Asymmetric information; Bargaining deadlock; Delay; Coase conjecture;
Keywords: C78; D82; I23; C92; Matching; Simultaneous screening; Early decision; Experiments;
Keywords: C60; C71; C78; D61; Ex-ante efficiency; Probabilistic assignment; Fairness; Probabilistic serial mechanism;
Keywords: C71; C78; D20; D30; J30; Shapley value; Fairness violations; Limited data; Inequality; Shapley distance;
Keywords: C78; C92; D47; D82; Matching; School choice; Experiment; Scale;
Keywords: C61; C71; C78; Stable solutions; Cooperative game; Core;
Keywords: C71; C78; Assignment games; Complements; Substitutes; Core; Convex games;
Keywords: Bargaining; Implicit communication; Punishment; Ultimatum game; C78; C91; D83;
Keywords: C71; C78; D51; Subdifferential; Core; Market game; Assignment model; Walrasian equilibrium; Perfect substitutability;
Keywords: C71; C78; Shapley value; Balanced contributions; Merge-externalities; Semivalues; Coalitional bargaining;
Keywords: C78; D47; D71; D78; College admissions; Many-to-many matching; Path independence; Substitutability; Modification; Law of aggregate demand;
Keywords: C78; D61; D78; General allocation problems; Externalities; Strategy-proofness; IR-core;
Keywords: C78; C92; D82; I24; Laboratory experiment; School choice; Strategy-proofness; Cognitive ability; Mechanism design;
Keywords: C78; D47; Matching; Envy-free; Lattice; Vacancy chain;
Keywords: C78; D47; D61; Two-sided matching; Market design; Matching with contracts; Matching with constraints; Discrete convex analysis; Deferred acceptance;
Keywords: D43; D21; D85; C71; C78; L1; Stable networks; Market sharing agreements; Information sharing; Bargaining;
Keywords: C71; C78; D45; D51; Price controls; Matching; Stable outcomes; Competitive equilibrium; Drèze equilibrium;
Keywords: C71; C72; C78; D71; Endowments-swapping-proofness; Top trading cycles; Strategy-proofness; Housing markets;
Keywords: C72; C78; D03; Bargaining; Deadline effect; Delay; Disagreement; Fairness concerns; Justice sensitivity;
Keywords: C78; D83; E22; G1; Search; Capital markets; Over-the-counter markets; Bargaining;
Keywords: C78; D47; D82; Type-specific minimum quotas; Stability; Priority rankings; Deferred acceptance; Controlled school choice;
Keywords: C78; D44; D45; Rationing price equilibrium; (Extended) English Price Sequences; Iterative English Auction Rule;
Keywords: C78; D82; D83; Bargaining; Reputation; Uncertainty; Delay; Option values;
Keywords: E21; R21; C78; Housing; Borrowing constraint; Matching;
Keywords: C73; C78; Evolution; Nash program; Logit choice; Egalitarianism;
Keywords: C71; C78; D47; D71; Indivisible object; Priority; House allocation; Housing market; Stability; Group strategy-proofness;
Keywords: Fairness norms; Normative conflict; Bargaining; Laboratory experiments; C78; C92; D74;