کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359110 | 1478729 | 2018 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
استحکام استراتژیک و اساسا هسته های ارزشمند مجددا بررسی شده است
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the individually-rational-core (IR-core) whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowments. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the IR-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose an IR-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the IR-core. We further show that the result cannot be generalized to supersets of the IR-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 176, July 2018, Pages 393-407
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 176, July 2018, Pages 393-407
نویسندگان
Lars Ehlers,