کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7352829 | 1477049 | 2018 | 40 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
قراردادهای متعارف، رفتار ذهنی و انتخاب منطق: برابر بودن بدون تقارن
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm. These results contrast with results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms. We complement the theory with experiments on human subjects, results of which suggest that non-best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias. This suggests the Egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 110, July 2018, Pages 273-294
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 110, July 2018, Pages 273-294
نویسندگان
Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary, Jonathan Newton,