کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7242722 | 1471623 | 2017 | 33 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
قراردادهای ناقص، مالکیت مشترک و انگیزه های سرمایه گذاری
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of an asset. It is ex post efficient that tomorrow the party with the larger valuation gets the asset. Yet, today the parties can make investments to enhance the asset's productivity. Contracts are incomplete, so today only the ownership structure can be specified, which may be renegotiated tomorrow. It turns out that shared ownership is often optimal. If the investments are embodied in the physical asset, it may be optimal that party B has a larger ownership share even when party A has a larger valuation and a better investment technology. When shared ownership is taken into account, joint ownership in the sense of bilateral veto power cannot be optimal, regardless of whether the investments are in human capital or in physical capital.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 144, December 2017, Pages 153-165
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 144, December 2017, Pages 153-165
نویسندگان
Patrick W. Schmitz,