کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7243826 | 1471670 | 2013 | 7 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Fooling the Nice Guys: Explaining receiver credulity in a public good game with lying and punishment
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
فریب دادن بچه های خوب: توضیح دادن اعتبار گیرنده در یک بازی خوب عمومی با دروغ و مجازات
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We demonstrate that receiver credulity can be understood through a false consensus effect: the likelihood with which individuals believe messages about the behavior of others can be explained by their own behavioral tendencies in a comparable situation. In a laboratory experiment, subjects play a public good game with punishment in which feedback on actual contributions is obscured. Instead, subjects communicate what they have contributed through a post hoc announcement mechanism. Using subjects' social value orientation as a proxy for their contribution tendency, we show that those high on the measure have inflated beliefs about the contribution of others. This, in turn, impacts their contribution and punishment decisions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 93, September 2013, Pages 321-327
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 93, September 2013, Pages 321-327
نویسندگان
Bernd Irlenbusch, Janna Ter Meer,