کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7344015 | 1476329 | 2018 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Green Investment and Coordination Failure: An Investors' Perspective
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
عدم سرمایه گذاری سبز و عدم هماهنگی: چشم انداز سرمایه گذاران
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کلمات کلیدی
شکار صحرا، شکست هماهنگ، سرمایه گذاری سبز، عدم قطعیت استراتژیک، رعایت ریسک،
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک
بوم شناسی، تکامل، رفتار و سامانه شناسی
چکیده انگلیسی
To achieve the goal of keeping global warming well below 2â¯Â°C, private investors have to shift capital from brown to green infrastructures and technologies and provide additional green investment. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic perspective on the challenge of triggering such investments. The question of climate change mitigation is often related to the prisoner's dilemma, a game with one Nash equilibrium. However, the authors perceive investment for mitigation and adaptation as a coordination problem of selecting among multiple equilibria. To illustrate this, we model a non-cooperative coordination game, related to the stag hunt, with a brown equilibrium with lower payoffs that can be achieved single-handedly and a green equilibrium with higher payoffs that requires coordination. As multiple experiments show, in such games actors often fail to coordinate on a payoff dominant equilibrium due to uncertainty. Thus, we discuss how uncertainty could be reduced along two options: one that concerns a change in the payoff structure of the game and another that concerns subjective probabilities.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Ecological Economics - Volume 150, August 2018, Pages 88-95
Journal: Ecological Economics - Volume 150, August 2018, Pages 88-95
نویسندگان
Jahel Mielke, Gesine A. Steudle,