کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
7352688 1477048 2018 24 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
محدودیت قیمت چند جانبه در بازی های تنظیم قیمت
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper, we characterize the set of pure strategy undominated equilibria in differentiated Bertrand oligopolies with linear demand and constant unit costs when firms may prefer not to produce. When all firms are active, there is a unique equilibrium. However, there is a continuum of non-equivalent Bertrand equilibria on a wide range of parameter values when the number of firms (n) is more than two and n⁎∈[2,n−1] firms are active. In each such equilibrium, the firms that are relatively more cost or quality efficient limit their prices to induce the exit of their rival(s). When n≥3, this game does not need to satisfy supermodularity, the single-crossing property, or log-supermodularity. Moreover, the best responses might have negative slopes. Our main results extend to a Stackelberg entry game where some established incumbents first set their prices, and then a potential entrant sets its price.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 111, September 2018, Pages 250-273
نویسندگان
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