کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
7352851 1477050 2018 22 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
چکیده انگلیسی
In a veto game a biased expert recommends an action that an uninformed decision maker can accept or reject for an outside option. The arrangement is ubiquitous in political institutions, corporations, and consumer markets but has seen limited use in applications due to a poor understanding of the equilibrium set and an ensuing debate over selection. We develop a simple method to construct every veto equilibrium and identify the most informative equilibrium in a setting that spans prior work. We show that Krishna and Morgan's (2001) equilibrium is maximally informative and strengthen Dessein's (2002) comparison of full delegation and veto. In an application we study the relationship between a patient and a doctor with a financial incentive to overtreat, and show that the doctor's bias harms the patient both through excessive treatment and information loss, that the latter can be substantial, and that insurance benefits both parties by improving communication.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 109, May 2018, Pages 104-125
نویسندگان
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