کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7352882 | 1477051 | 2018 | 31 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
ارزش بازی های همکاری بیش از گراف ها و بازی ها با ائتلاف های غیر مجاز
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting 'graph value' (and 'S-value' in the general case) is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 108, March 2018, Pages 22-36
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 108, March 2018, Pages 22-36
نویسندگان
Ziv Hellman, Ron Peretz,