کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7372903 | 1479727 | 2018 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Common belief in approximate rationality
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
اعتقاد مشترک به عقلانیت تقریبی
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper substitutes the standard rationality assumption with approximate rationality in normal form games. We assume that players believe that their opponents might be ε-rational, i.e. willing to settle for a suboptimal choice, and so give up an amount ε of expected utility, in response to the belief they hold. For every player i and every opponents' degree of rationality ε, we require player i to attach at least probability Fi(ε) to his opponent being ε-rational, where the functions Fi are assumed to be common knowledge amongst the players. We refer to this event as belief in F-rationality. The notion of Common Belief in F-Rationality (CBFR) is then introduced as an approximate rationality counterpart of the established Common Belief in Rationality. Finally, a corresponding recursive procedure is designed that characterizes those beliefs players can hold under CBFR.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 91, January 2018, Pages 6-16
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 91, January 2018, Pages 6-16
نویسندگان
Angie Mounir, Andrés Perea, Elias Tsakas,