کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7374392 | 1479851 | 2016 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Which matters: “Paying to play” or stable business relationship? Evidence on analyst recommendation and mutual fund commission fee payment
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
کدام یک از موارد مهم: پرداخت به بازی یا رابطه تجاری پایدار؟ شواهد بر توصیه تحلیلگر و پرداخت هزینه های صندوق مشترک صندوق
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper investigates the factors that affect the likelihood of maintaining a stable relationship between a brokerage firm and its client funds and the effect of such a stable business relationship on analyst recommendations. We find that young funds, particularly those in small fund families, have more incentives to maintain business ties with their current brokerage firms. A common ownership affiliation between a fund and a brokerage firm or with a third institution further enhances the probability that the brokerage firm and the funds will maintain a stable relationship. More importantly, analysts issue more optimistic recommendations on stocks that are held by their brokerage firms stably related funds (SRFs) than on stocks that are held by other funds. The effect is more pronounced after excluding large firms. The results are robust after controlling for underwriting relation, commission fees, funds' shareholding and other factors.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal - Volume 40, Part B, December 2016, Pages 403-423
Journal: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal - Volume 40, Part B, December 2016, Pages 403-423
نویسندگان
Haozhi Huang, Mingsheng Li, Jing Shi,