کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7463308 | 1484941 | 2018 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Evidence of a winning-cohesion tradeoff under multi-winner ranked-choice voting
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
شواهد تجدیدنظر بر انعطاف پذیری برنده در انتخاب رأی رتبه بندی انتخابی
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کلمات کلیدی
رأی رتبه انتخابی، رأی قابل انتقال تنها، انسجام حزب، تغییر حزب،
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
علوم اجتماعی
جغرافیا، برنامه ریزی و توسعه
چکیده انگلیسی
New interest in "multi-winner ranked-choice voting" raises old questions about effects on party cohesion. Earlier scholars thought this single transferable vote (STV) rule was net-problematic for parties. This paper consults the roll-call and electoral records in Cincinnati (1929-57) and Worcester, Mass. (1949-60), two of three American STV implementations that produced conventional wisdom. First, I show how party cohesion could be high or low. Then I show how low-cohesion terms followed elections in which candidates campaigned for themselves over their parties. Finally, I show that parties endorsed such candidates when they needed the votes to expand their seat shares. In sum, the data suggest a strategic environment in which majority-seeking parties reach beyond their traditional bases - potentially at the expense of legislative cohesion. Whether that is good or bad depends on the value we give to cohesion.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Electoral Studies - Volume 52, April 2018, Pages 128-138
Journal: Electoral Studies - Volume 52, April 2018, Pages 128-138
نویسندگان
Jack Santucci,