کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
8254366 1533620 2017 5 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Historical payoff promotes cooperation in voluntary prisoner's dilemma game
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
بازپرداخت تاریخی، ترویج همکاری در بازی معضل داوطلبانه زندانیان است
کلمات کلیدی
همکاری، معضل زندانی، مشارکت داوطلبانه، بازده تاریخی،
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه فیزیک و نجوم فیزیک آماری و غیرخطی
چکیده انگلیسی
Voluntary participation, as a simple yet valid mechanism to promote cooperation in game theory, has been received a great deal of attention. Besides, historical payoff has also been verified to be an efficient way of promoting cooperation. Inspired by these facts, here we introduce historical payoff into the measure of fitness in voluntary prisoner's dilemma. In detail, the contribution of historical payoff is decided by the tunable parameter w: when w equals to zero, the traditional voluntary prisoner's dilemma game returns, where no historical payoff is contained; while positive w involves the impact of historical payoff. It is shown that cooperative behavior is remarkably promoted with increment of w for small b; while for large b, system will show the cycle dominance of these strategies and avoid the dominance of defection. This indicates that historical payoff has a positive impact on the evolution of cooperation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Chaos, Solitons & Fractals - Volume 105, December 2017, Pages 145-149
نویسندگان
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