کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
838197 | 908356 | 2010 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Evolutionary game model for a marketing cooperative with penalty for unfaithfulness
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
سایر رشته های مهندسی
مهندسی (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
A game-theoretical model for the behaviour in a marketing cooperative is proposed. For the strategy choice an evolutionary dynamics is introduced. Considering a model with penalty for unfaithfulness and Cournot type market situation, it is shown that, if the penalty is effective then this strategy dynamics drives the players towards an attractive solution, a particular type of Nash equilibrium. A model with redistribution of penalty is also studied. For the symmetric case, on the basis of stability analysis of the strategy dynamics, in terms of the model parameters, sufficient conditions are provided for the strategy choice to converge to a strict Nash equilibrium.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications - Volume 11, Issue 2, April 2010, Pages 742–749
Journal: Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications - Volume 11, Issue 2, April 2010, Pages 742–749
نویسندگان
Zoltán Varga, Antonino Scarelli, Ross Cressman, József Garay,