A Model of Evolutionary Dynamics with Quasiperiodic Forcing

Evolutionary dynamics combines game theory and nonlinear dynamics to model competition in biological and social situations. The replicator equation is a standard paradigm in evolutionary dynamics. The growth rate of each strategy is its excess fitness: the deviation of its fitness from the average. The game-theoretic aspect of the model lies in the choice of fitness function, which is determined by a payoff matrix.Previous work by Ruelas and Rand investigated the Rock-Paper-Scissors replicator dynamics problem with periodic forcing of the payoff coefficients. This work extends the previous to consider the case of quasiperiodic forcing. This model may find applications in biological or social systems where competition is affected by cyclical processes on different scales, such as days/years or weeks/years.We study the quasiperiodically forced Rock-Paper-Scissors problem using numerical simulation, and Floquet theory and har- monic balance. We investigate the linear stability of the interior equilibrium point; we find that the region of stability in frequency space has fractal boundary.