An investigation of how the informal communication of firm preferences influences managerial honesty

This study investigates the effectiveness of informal firm communication at motivating managerial honesty. Specifically, it focuses on the effectiveness of informal cost targets, which communicate firms’ specific cost preferences to managers without tying managers’ compensation to reporting costs that meet those targets. I develop predictions about how the tightness of an informal cost target influences the effect that a cost target has on managers’ reporting honesty. Using an experimental setting, I examine three levels of target tightness—loose, moderate, and tight—within a uniformly distributed cost range and where participants’ financial incentives are to ignore the cost target and fully misreport their cost information. I find that both moderate and loose cost targets, on average, increase honesty relative to when the firm does not communicate a specific target or it communicates a tight target. Tight targets have no significant effect, positive or negative, on honesty. Whereas prior research focuses only on the potential benefits of firms communicating their general preferences, my study provides important insights regarding the potential incremental effectiveness of communicating specific preferences.