Gender differences in personnel management: Some experimental evidence

• We explore gender differences in behavior in a stylized labor market.
• Contracts between employers and employees rely either on mutual trust and reciprocity or on explicit penalties for shirking.
• We find only minor gender differences in behavior, which dissipate over time.
• Workers shirk more if employers choose not to impose a penalty when that option is available.

We explore gender differences in behavior in the context of two types of labor contracts, those that rely on mutual trust and reciprocity and those that specify penalties for shirking. Our main finding is an overall lack of significant gender differences in behavior. In the treatments with penalties for shirking, female employers offer higher rent compared to men and in those treatments this generosity affects female earnings adversely. We find that while workers do reciprocate more generous contract offers by shirking less, there are no pronounced gender differences in shirking. We find that not using a penalty when the option is available leads to significantly higher levels of shirking.