کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
884342 1471685 2009 22 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs
چکیده انگلیسی

We analyze a model of conformity with contrasting inferences. Given a form of ‘strong inferences’, any non-conforming agent is believed to have ‘extreme preferences’ and can expect to receive low esteem. With a weaker form of inferences, a non-conforming agent could be inferred to have ‘average preferences’ and can expect a smaller fall in esteem. We find that the type of inferences need not influence whether a conformist equilibrium exists. It will, however, impact on the size of the set of conformist equilibria and thus weakening inferences acts as an equilibrium selection device.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 70, Issues 1–2, May 2009, Pages 164–185
نویسندگان
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