کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884547 | 912398 | 2007 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation](/preview/png/884547.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information. While posting a higher wage increases the probability of filling the vacancy, it decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply. The optimal wage scheme entails a trade-off between the probability of filling the vacancy, the rents left to the worker, and the expected worker's motivation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 62, Issue 4, April 2007, Pages 605–624
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 62, Issue 4, April 2007, Pages 605–624
نویسندگان
Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur,