کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884594 | 1471691 | 2006 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations](/preview/png/884594.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper offers an explanation for why a principal may demand too much paperwork from a subordinate: due to limited liability and moral hazard a principal is unable to appropriate all rents. Internal paperwork allows a more accurate monitoring of the agent and enables the principal to appropriate a larger part of the agent’s rent. In her decision the principal disregards the agent’s cost increase of more internal paperwork. Consequently, the requested amount of internal paperwork may be too high from both the agent’s personal point of view and the organization as a whole.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 60, Issue 4, August 2006, Pages 460–470
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 60, Issue 4, August 2006, Pages 460–470
نویسندگان
Roland Strausz,