Deterministic versus probabilistic consequences of trust and trustworthiness: An experimental investigation

• In an Investment Game experiment, we manipulate efficiency of trust and reciprocity.
• The variation is performed in both deterministic and uncertain environments.
• Trustees' reciprocity is influenced by efficiency of trustors' (not own) choices.
• Higher deterministic rewards are associated with higher levels of reciprocity.
• However, we find that an uncertain environment diminishes reciprocity.

There is overwhelming evidence of reciprocal behavior, driven by intentions. However, the role of consequences is less clear cut. Experimentally manipulating how efficient trust and reciprocity can be in deterministic and uncertain environments allows us to study how payoff consequences of trust and trustworthiness affect reciprocity. According to the results for our modified Investment Game, trustees reward trust more when trust is more efficient but do not adjust rewards when the efficiency of rewarding is varied. Furthermore, higher deterministic benefits result in higher levels of reciprocity for all trust levels, whereas an uncertain environment diminishes reciprocity.