Putting social preferences to work: Can revealed preferences predict real effort provision?

• This paper examines real effort provision for preferred social outcomes.
• A model of predicting effort provision for a preferred social outcome is established.
• Dictator games, real effort tasks measure the consistency of preference and effort.
• Laboratory experiments show pro-social individuals do not exert effort consistently.

This paper presents a model of real effort provision in conjunction with rational social preference theory to predict how individuals exert effort to replace an exogenously determined “state of the world” with a preferred social outcome. Binary dictator games and real effort tasks are used to examine whether individuals exert effort in a manner that is consistent with their revealed preferences. The analysis of controlled laboratory experiments suggest that while individuals’ effort provisions are generally consistent with the theory, those who reveal relatively pro-social preferences fail to procure their “preferred” outcomes too frequently when the state of the world is highly inequitable in their favor. Consideration is given to alternative theories, namely ego depletion and cognitive dissonance, as potential explanations of social outcomes. There is evidence to suggest that dictators, on average, experience ego depletion which leads to a reduction in pro-social behavior through time.