کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
885031 | 912654 | 2010 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
بازاریابی و مدیریت بازار
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators. We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy. We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes. Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart, and by 50% after the surprise restart. In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Psychology - Volume 31, Issue 6, December 2010, Pages 872–883
Journal: Journal of Economic Psychology - Volume 31, Issue 6, December 2010, Pages 872–883
نویسندگان
Pablo Guillen, Enrique Fatas, Pablo Brañas-Garza,