کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
885063 1471732 2013 7 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Lying and team incentives
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری بازاریابی و مدیریت بازار
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Lying and team incentives
چکیده انگلیسی

We investigate the influence of two popular compensation schemes on subjects’ inclination to lie by adapting an experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a fairly neglected feature of compensation schemes. Moreover, when disentangling different motives of the more pronounced unethical conduct under team incentives, we find that subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can diffuse their responsibility, i.e., their deceptive acts cannot unambiguously be attributed to them individually. Our findings are robust even when controlling for individual difference variables. In both compensation schemes subjects who are younger, male, high on Extraversion, and high on Neuroticism tend to lie more.


► We investigate the effect of individual piece-rates and team incentives on lying.
► We adapt the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008).
► Lying is more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece rates.
► Subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can diffuse their responsibility.
► Subjects who are younger, male, high on Extraversion and Neuroticism lie more.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Psychology - Volume 34, February 2013, Pages 1–7
نویسندگان
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