کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
885095 | 912659 | 2012 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

Preference reversals are frequently observed in the lab, but almost all designs use completely transparent prospects, which are rarely features of decision making elsewhere. This raises questions of external validity. We test the robustness of the phenomenon to gambles that incorporate realistic ambiguity in both payoffs and probabilities. In addition, we test a recent explanation of preference reversals by loss aversion, which would also restrict the incidence of reversals outside the lab. According to this account, reversals occur largely because the valuation task endows subject with a gamble, activating loss aversion. This contrasts with the choice task, where the reference point is pre-experiment wealth. We test this explanation by holding the reference point constant. Our evidence suggests that reversals are only slightly diminished with ambiguity. We find no evidence supporting their explanation by loss aversion.
► We study whether preference reversal results generalise to more realistic decision settings.
► We use doubly ambiguous gambles, that are vague in both probabilities and payoffs.
► We hold the reference point constant between choice and valuation tasks.
► Reversals are encouraged by transparency, but are robust to both manipulations.
► Our results contradict the loss aversion explanation of preference reversals.
Journal: Journal of Economic Psychology - Volume 33, Issue 1, February 2012, Pages 48–57