کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
885473 912691 2009 9 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری بازاریابی و مدیریت بازار
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
چکیده انگلیسی

In the recent literature, several competing hypotheses have been advanced to explain the stylized fact of declining contributions in repeated public goods experiments. We present results of an experiment that has been designed to evaluate these hypotheses. The experiment elicits individual beliefs about the contributions of the partners in the repeated game and involves between-subjects variation on information feedback. The data favor the hypothesis of selfish-biased conditional cooperation as the source for the declining contributions over the competing hypotheses.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Psychology - Volume 30, Issue 1, February 2009, Pages 52–60
نویسندگان
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