کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
9547606 1371163 2005 20 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Unilateral regulation of bilateral trade in greenhouse gas emission permits
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک بوم شناسی، تکامل، رفتار و سامانه شناسی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Unilateral regulation of bilateral trade in greenhouse gas emission permits
چکیده انگلیسی
One price instrument (tariff) and two quantity instruments (discount, quota) to prevent the exporting country from issuing more permits are examined. Each instrument restricts trade and alters the terms of trade for the two countries. The importing country (and regulator) prefers an import tariff and an import quota to a carbon discount. If the exporting country releases additional permits, the importing country should not try to keep total emissions constant, as that would be ineffective and maybe even counterproductive. Instead, the importing country should aim to keep the total import constant; this would impose costs on the exporting country that are independent of the policy instrument; an import quota would be the cheapest option for the importing country. An import quota would also stress the idea of supplementary of the flexible mechanism as it increases the share of emissions reduced domestically. Compliance and liability issues constrain the market further. However, both the importing and the exporting country would prefer that the permit seller is liable in case of non-compliance, as sellers' liability would less constrain the market.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Ecological Economics - Volume 54, Issue 4, 15 September 2005, Pages 397-416
نویسندگان
, ,