کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9551713 | 1373538 | 2005 | 25 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game](/preview/png/9551713.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper investigates the implications of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Games Econ. Behav. 10, 6-38; 1998, Exper. Econ. 1, 9-41] in the ultimatum bargaining game. It is shown that, in a normal-form QRE (NQRE), each bargainer's decision depends critically on the anticipated behavior of the other, and there is a NQRE in which the proposer makes any offer between zero and equal split as a strict best response. The application of NQRE to the experimental data [Slonim and Roth, 1998, Econometrica 66, 569-596] suggests that the history dependence observed in the experiment is a result of the strategic interactions between bargainers.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 51, Issue 2, May 2005, Pages 324-348
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 51, Issue 2, May 2005, Pages 324-348
نویسندگان
Kang-Oh Yi,