کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9551750 | 1373541 | 2005 | 38 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions](/preview/png/9551750.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We construct a relatively simple model of bidding with synergies and solve it for both open outcry and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. The essential behavioral forces involved in these auctions are: (1) A demand reduction force resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple-unit demands have when synergies are relatively inconsequential, and (2) Bidding above stand-alone values in order to capture significant complementarities between units. The latter creates a potential “exposure problem,” as bidders may win only parts of a package and earn negative profits. Bidding outcomes are closer to equilibrium in clock compared to sealed-bid auctions. However, there are substantial and systematic deviations from equilibrium, with patterns of out-of-equilibrium play differing systematically between the two auction formats. These patterns of out-of-equilibrium play are analyzed, along with their effects on revenue and efficiency.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 53, Issue 2, November 2005, Pages 170-207
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 53, Issue 2, November 2005, Pages 170-207
نویسندگان
John H. Kagel, Dan Levin,