کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9551760 | 1373542 | 2005 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity requires that no voter has negative power, and at least one has positive power. Transfer requires that, when winning coalitions are enhanced in a game, the change in voting power depends only on the change in the game, i.e., on the set of new winning coalitions. The most crucial axiom is composition: the value of a player in a compound voting game is the product of his power in the relevant first-tier game and the power of his delegate in the second-tier game. We prove that these three axioms categorically determine the Banzhaf index.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 51, Issue 1, April 2005, Pages 20-30
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 51, Issue 1, April 2005, Pages 20-30
نویسندگان
Pradeep Dubey, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko,