Hierarchical Bayesian analysis of outcome- and process-based social preferences and beliefs in Dictator Games and sequential Prisoner’s Dilemmas

• We estimate social orientations in Dictator Games (DG) and Prisoner’s Dilemmas (PD).
• Hierarchical Bayesian estimates show strong negative and mild positive reciprocity.
• Compared with the DG frame, the PD frame makes subject more competitive.
• We also simultaneously analyze subjects’ beliefs about others’ social orientations.
• Results support the consensus effect and refute the rational beliefs assumption.

In this paper, using a within-subjects design, we estimate the utility weights that subjects attach to the outcome of their interaction partners in four decision situations: (1) binary Dictator Games (DG), second player’s role in the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) after the first player (2) cooperated and (3) defected, and (4) first player’s role in the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We find that the average weights in these four decision situations have the following order: (1)>(2)>(4)>(3)(1)>(2)>(4)>(3). Moreover, the average weight is positive in (1) but negative in (2), (3), and (4). Our findings indicate the existence of strong negative and small positive reciprocity for the average subject, but there is also high interpersonal variation in the weights in these four nodes. We conclude that the PD frame makes subjects more competitive than the DG frame. Using hierarchical Bayesian modeling, we simultaneously analyze beliefs of subjects about others’ utility weights in the same four decision situations. We compare several alternative theoretical models on beliefs, e.g., rational beliefs (Bayesian-Nash equilibrium) and a consensus model. Our results on beliefs strongly support the consensus effect and refute rational beliefs: there is a strong relationship between own preferences and beliefs and this relationship is relatively stable across the four decision situations.