Why do some employees support welfare states more than others? Skill profiles and social policy preferences in the United States

Hypotheses based on skill asset arguments and Weberian perspectives of social closure emphasize the role of asset specificity and skill standards in accounting for American employees’ social policy preferences. The evidence from three waves of General Social Surveys shows that employees with high asset specificity are more likely to support higher social spending, which is consistent with Iversen and Soksice’ argument. The evidence also supports the skill asset specificity thesis at the occupational level: employees with a high level of specific skill standards compared to general skill standards have stronger incentives to support higher social spending. However, controlling for the denominator effects, the individual asset specificity measure loses its explanatory power, while the effects of occupational asset specificity and general skill standards are robust. The findings suggest that the level and composition of skill assets at the occupational level are critical for understanding of employees’ social policy preferences in the era of industrial restructuring.