کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
959062 929124 2007 19 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The identity of the generator in the problem of social cost
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
The identity of the generator in the problem of social cost
چکیده انگلیسی

One of Coase's central insights is that distinguishing between the generator and recipient of an externality is of limited value because externality problems are reciprocal. We reconsider the relevance of the identity of the generator in a model with non-contractible investment ex ante but frictionless bargaining over the externality ex post. In this framework, a party may distort its investment to worsen the other's threat point in bargaining. We demonstrate that the presence of this distortion depends, among other factors, on whether the investing party is a generator. Social efficiency can sometimes be improved by conditioning property rights on the identity of the generator: for example, assigning damage rights if the rights holder is a generator and injunction rights if the rights holder is a recipient can be more efficient than either unconditional damage or injunction rights.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 54, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 49–67
نویسندگان
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