کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
959285 | 929203 | 2012 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Corruption and forest concessions
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We examine how corruption impacts a central government's application of concession policy instruments consisting of royalty rates, concession size, environmentally sensitive logging levels, and enforcement. Harvesters have incentives to illegally log by taking more volume than is allowed, high grading through removal of only the highest valued and best formed trees, and shirking environmentally sensitive logging requirements, all of which reduce public goods produced from native tropical forests. Corruption is introduced through logging inspectors who can be bribed by harvesters to avoid fines associated with illegal logging. Both the theory and a simulation are used to compare policy design under corruption and no corruption.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 63, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 92–104
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 63, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 92–104
نویسندگان
Gregory S. Amacher, Markku Ollikainen, Erkki Koskela,