کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
959402 | 929236 | 2006 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Time inconsistent resource conservation contracts
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Are certain types of commonly observed resource conservation contracts inefficient? In this paper we construct a model embodying realistic characteristics of resource contracts. We find that resource contracts that share these characteristics are economically inefficient. This inefficiency stems from a time-inconsistency inherent in the contracts. There are two possible ways to overcome this time-inconsistency. The first is to employ a sufficiently large penalty for early termination of the contract. The second and possibly easier method is to offer an upward sloping conservation payment schedule so far overlooked by policy makers. Under this payment schedule, the agent's ex ante and ex post contract choices coincide, social externalities are fully internalized, and the contractual outcome is economically efficient even in the absence of a penalty for early termination.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 52, Issue 1, July 2006, Pages 454-468
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 52, Issue 1, July 2006, Pages 454-468
نویسندگان
Sumeet Gulati, James Vercammen,