کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
959603 | 1478903 | 2013 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Contracting under asymmetric information: Evidence from lockup agreements in seasoned equity offerings
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
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چکیده انگلیسی
We document the frequent use of lockup agreements in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and examine the determinants of their use, duration, and early release. We find that the likelihood of an SEO lockup and its duration are positively related to issuer information asymmetry measures. Lockup duration is negatively related to underwriter spreads and underpricing, indicating that lockups lower expected flotation costs. Lockups are frequently released early following share prices rises. We conclude that lockups represent a contracting solution to asymmetric information and agency problems that plague equity issues by helping to insure SEO quality and deter opportunistic insider trading.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 110, Issue 3, December 2013, Pages 607–626
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 110, Issue 3, December 2013, Pages 607–626
نویسندگان
Jonathan M. Karpoff, Gemma Lee, Ronald W. Masulis,