کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
959918 | 929387 | 2007 | 29 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
Signaling is the most commonly cited explanation for stock repurchases in the academic literature. Yet, there is little evidence on whether managers intentionally use repurchases as signaling devices. Using a firm's financial reporting behavior to infer managerial intent, we find evidence suggesting that managers intentionally use fixed-price repurchase tender offers to signal undervaluation. In contrast, we find no evidence that managers use Dutch-auction tender offers to signal undervaluation. Instead, firms engaging in Dutch-auction repurchases act as if they are trying to deflate their earnings prior to the repurchases to further reduce the repurchasing price.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 85, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 205–233
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 85, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 205–233
نویسندگان
Henock Louis, Hal White,