کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960021 | 929400 | 2013 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The economics of club bidding and value creation
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
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چکیده انگلیسی
Many acquisitions are conducted by clubs, i.e., coalitions of acquirers that submit a single bid. We present a novel analysis of club bidding where the club creates value by aggregating, at least partially, bidders' values. We show that club formation can lead to higher acquisition prices when the number of bidders is exogenously fixed and large. However, when entry costs require bidders to optimize their participation decisions, club formation acts as an endogenous limit on competition and reduces the target's premium. In contrast, social efficiency with club bidding is always higher. Our findings can reconcile the contradictory evidence on club bidding.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 108, Issue 2, May 2013, Pages 493–505
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 108, Issue 2, May 2013, Pages 493–505
نویسندگان
Robert Marquez, Rajdeep Singh,