کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960180 | 929417 | 2007 | 32 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Determinants of the floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze the effects of managerial incentive, firm characteristics and market timing on floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms. We find that chief financial officer's (CFO's), not chief executive officer's (CEO's), incentive has a strong influence on firm's debt structure. When CFOs have incentives to increase (decrease) firm risk, firms obtain volatility-increasing (-decreasing) debt structure. These effects are present only for CFOs who are not subject to high monitoring by board members, CEOs, or corporate control market. Our findings suggest that agency problems at the level of non-CEO executives could be an important driver of various corporate decisions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 85, Issue 3, September 2007, Pages 755–786
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 85, Issue 3, September 2007, Pages 755–786
نویسندگان
Sudheer Chava, Amiyatosh Purnanandam,