کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960244 | 929426 | 2006 | 44 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
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چکیده انگلیسی
We examine a sample of connected transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders. We address three questions: What types of connected transactions lead to expropriation of minority shareholders? Which firms are more likely to expropriate? Does the market anticipate the expropriation by firms? On average, firms announcing connected transactions earn significant negative excess returns, significantly lower than firms announcing similar arm's length transactions. We find limited evidence that firms undertaking connected transactions trade at discounted valuations prior to the expropriation, suggesting that investors cannot predict expropriation and revalue firms only when expropriation does occur.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 82, Issue 2, November 2006, Pages 343–386
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 82, Issue 2, November 2006, Pages 343–386
نویسندگان
Yan-Leung Cheung, P. Raghavendra Rau, Aris Stouraitis,