کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960286 | 929431 | 2006 | 33 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
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چکیده انگلیسی
Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 80, Issue 2, May 2006, Pages 385–417
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 80, Issue 2, May 2006, Pages 385–417
نویسندگان
Belen Villalonga, Raphael Amit,