کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960436 | 929461 | 2010 | 25 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 95, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages 400–424
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 95, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages 400–424
نویسندگان
Massimo Massa, Jonathan Reuter, Eric Zitzewitz,