کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960556 | 929497 | 2008 | 28 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate the relation between corporate value and the proportion of the board made up of independent directors in 799 firms with a dominant shareholder across 22 countries. We find a positive relation, especially in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. The findings suggest that a dominant shareholder, were he so inclined, could offset, at least in part, the documented value discount associated with weak country-level shareholder protection by appointing an ‘independent’ board. The cost to the dominant shareholder of doing so is the loss in perquisites associated with being a dominant shareholder. Thus, not all dominant shareholders choose independent boards.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 87, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 73–100
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 87, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 73–100
نویسندگان
Jay Dahya, Orlin Dimitrov, John J. McConnell,