کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960587 | 929502 | 2006 | 45 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic alliances, equity stakes, and entry deterrence
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
I study how strategic alliances and their impact on future competitive incentives can motivate interfirm equity sales. In the model, an alliance between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm improves efficiency for both. However, the requisite knowledge transfer heightens the established firm's incentive to enter one of its partner's markets. I show that equity can eliminate the entry incentive, but accommodation is sometimes chosen to encourage entrepreneurial effort on future growth options. I analyze stake sizes, block pricing, and welfare effects. The results have implications for equity alliances, corporate venture capital, and the organization of research activities.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 80, Issue 1, April 2006, Pages 35–79
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 80, Issue 1, April 2006, Pages 35–79
نویسندگان
Richmond D. Mathews,