کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
960644 | 929529 | 2006 | 33 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper examines the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. We find that the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport. We do not find that the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, i.e., equity, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport. Relative to other components of compensation, stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in CEO wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 79, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 35–67
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 79, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 35–67
نویسندگان
Natasha Burns, Simi Kedia,