کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
961606 | 929882 | 2009 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Trials, tricks and transparency: How disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم پزشکی و سلامت
پزشکی و دندانپزشکی
سیاست های بهداشت و سلامت عمومی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms' gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Health Economics - Volume 28, Issue 6, December 2009, Pages 1141-1153
Journal: Journal of Health Economics - Volume 28, Issue 6, December 2009, Pages 1141-1153
نویسندگان
Matthias Dahm, Paula González, Nicolás Porteiro,