کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
964871 | 930648 | 2006 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Can you teach old dogs new tricks? On complementarity of human capital and incentives
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Contract theory suggests that firm performance can be improved by appointing new managers and/or by introducing better incentives. Furthermore, these two changes should be complementary - their effects reinforce each other. Using data on privatized firms in the Czech Republic, this paper presents results that suggest complementarity between the appointment of new managers and introduction of incentives in a transition economy. The results also show that ignoring the complementarity may lead to the wrong conclusion that the effect of incentives is weak. Managerial incentives seem to work only after the new post-privatization managers are appointed.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Money and Finance - Volume 25, Issue 3, April 2006, Pages 445-458
Journal: Journal of International Money and Finance - Volume 25, Issue 3, April 2006, Pages 445-458
نویسندگان
Jana P. Fidrmuc, Jan Fidrmuc,