کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
965561 | 930818 | 2008 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE schemes. The principal can take actions to constrain the agents' hold-up power by limiting their outside options and by protecting property rights, but once these actions are costly, a trade-off between incentive provision and agent control appears. The model contributes to the theory of the firm. It indicates why firms, not agents, own assets, and why peer-dependent incentive systems are more common within than between firms. J. Japanese Int. Economies 22 (2) (2008) 229-241.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies - Volume 22, Issue 2, June 2008, Pages 229-241
Journal: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies - Volume 22, Issue 2, June 2008, Pages 229-241
نویسندگان
Ola Kvaløy, Trond E. Olsen,