کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
967641 | 931365 | 2006 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper employs a multi-country delegation monetary policy model and argues that a decision-making mechanism based on the median voter theorem where intensity of preferences cannot play a role does not capture important aspects of policy setting in the European Monetary Union. Replacing the median voter mechanism with a less restrictive “weighted mean mechanism”, it is shown that strategic delegation can lead to a surprising degree of central bank inflation aversion. This finding supports the “The Twin Sister Hypothesis” and the perception of the European Central Bank implementing the policy of the Bundesbank rather than a more inflationary monetary policy.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics - Volume 53, Issue 4, May 2006, Pages 659-669
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics - Volume 53, Issue 4, May 2006, Pages 659-669
نویسندگان
Rasmus Fatum,