کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
968330 | 931508 | 2015 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
کلمات کلیدی
1- مقدمه
2- مدل و قانون بهینه
3- MPRهای بهینه برای هدف گیری تورم شدید و هدف گیری نرخ ارز واقعی
3-1 بانک مرکزی مستقل
3-2 بانک مرکزی وابسته
4- بحث و برخی نتایج دیگر
4-1 فساد و MPRها
4-2 اثر وابستگی بانک مرکزی
5- نتیجه گیری و برخی مفاهیم ضمنی سیاست گذاری
Using a simple macroeconomic model, this paper examines the interaction between corruption and central bank independence in the construction of an optimal monetary policy rule where the instrument of policy is the real interest rate. As such, we are especially interested in how the policy instrument reacts to key macroeconomic variables in the face of possible corruption (modelled here as tax leakage) and possible dependence by the central bank on the fiscal policy process. We analyse this issue by deriving optimal rules for a strict inflation targeting and a real exchange rate target regime. We find that, firstly, the existence of corruption imposes an inflationary bias on the optimal rule – even when the central bank is independent. We find, furthermore, that a central bank that exhibits some dependence exacerbates this effect.
Journal: Journal of Policy Modeling - Volume 37, Issue 3, May–June 2015, Pages 501–509